An Argument for Staying Home


Polo Camacho | PhD. Candidate in Philosophy | University of Kansas


If you’ve taken an ethics course, chances are you’re familiar with Peter Singer’s paper ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’. As an ethics instructor, I’ve been fortunate enough to teach this paper to undergraduate students first hand, and watch as their reactions unfold before me, which are predictable now for the most part. As the argument begins to sink in, students squirm in their seats, tilt their heads and then, once the argument has been fully digested, a flurry of hands fill the classroom. The counter-arguments abound.

I mention this paper because Peter Singer’s argument, or a version of it anyway, is relevant for us here and now. As I sit here writing, the number of positive COVID-19 cases in the United States is approaching 6.5 million, and the number of deaths worldwide is approaching 27 million. Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, once estimated that between 100,000 to 240,000 people in the United States will die as a result of the pandemic. So far, the US has reported around 180,000 deaths. At pandemic press briefings and in the media, Fauci has urged Americans to practice social distancing, self-quarantine, and proper hygiene. The coronavirus is particularly dangerous for people over the age of 50 with underlying conditions, although there seem to be a number of cases where the disease has claimed the lives of younger individuals with no underlying conditions.

For those who are unfamiliar with the paper, Peter Singers’ argument begins with the idea that suffering is bad. This point is relatively straightforward. Starvation is bad. Severely fracturing your ribs is bad. Drowning is bad. Dying from a highly-infectious disease, like COVID-19, is bad.

Peter Singer’s second premise is also straightforward: if we can prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything morally comparable, we should do it. To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario: After a job interview, you take a stroll through the park. All of a sudden, you notice a child drowning in a nearby pond. The pond is somewhat shallow, so you could easily save the child’s life, but doing so would ruin your brand new suit, and time is of the essence. What would you do in this scenario? Most, if not all students, agree that they would save the child’s life, even if it means ruining the suit. Most importantly, however, they believe that we should save the child’s life, that we are morally obligated to save a life.

If we accept Singer’s first and second premise, then the received reaction to people’s suffering is unjustified. Think about it. When considering giving to a charity, we rarely take it that we have a moral duty to give. What’s more, we don’t believe we’re in the wrong for not giving. Peter Singer’s argument suggests otherwise. For Singer, we are not going “above and beyond” by giving to charity, we are doing what is morally required of us, we are doing the right thing. Giving to charity alleviates suffering (at least in some cases).

Consequently, then, by not giving to charity, we are committing a wrong-doing. This is because we are each in a position to prevent something bad from happening and yet we are falling short. We are morally required to ruin our suit if it implies saving a drowning child in much the same way we are morally required to sacrifice our daily cup of coffee, a weekend cocktail, or ordering take-out if it implies saving a person’s life through charitable giving.

This is about the time where students in my ethics class start squirming, and I don’t blame them. Many of us are taught that by giving to charities, we are going above and beyond the call of duty. This is reflected in the way we react when friends and acquaintances mention giving to charities like Oxfam or Action Against Hunger; we applaud their generosity. We do not take it that charitable giving (for the purposes of preventing suffering) is morally required of us. After students are presented with Singer’s argument, this idea clashes with the second premise in Singer’s argument, i.e. that if we can prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything morally comparable, we should do it. Students soon realize that both claims cannot be true, and desperately try to save the idea that preventing suffering is not morally required of us by combatting Singer’s argument.

Rather than delving into counter-arguments (and believe me there are many), I’d like to bring Singer’s argument down-to-earth by relating it to the coronavirus pandemic. Ultimately, I want to show that Singer’s argument is as relevant today as it was when he first sketched it in 1971. As Singer points out, suffering is bad. Currently, thousands of people all over the world are suffering from COVID-19. Though about 80% of people with the infection suffer mild to moderate symptoms that do not require hospitalization, the remaining percentage may not be so lucky. This is because coronavirus sometimes causes severe respiratory issues, including pneumonia and acute respiratory failure, both of which require immediate medical intervention. A very small percentage of these individuals will die; the death rate, according to Anthony Fauci, is estimated to be 10 times deadlier than the seasonal flu.

Singer’s second premise is that if we can prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we should do it. As I stated above, we have been urged by immunologists, our federal government, state and local officials, to stay home. The rationale here is simple. The coronavirus, like other viruses, spreads primarily through the inhaling of droplets, and droplets are emitted every time someone sneezes or coughs. One cough may seem harmless, but there are an abundance of models that demonstrate how quickly the disease can spread within a community. These models support the idea that the more we go out, the more likely we are to catch COVID-19 and pass it on to others. According to Anthony Fauci, the director of NIAID, if we practice social distancing and self-quarantine, we can reduce the number of deaths caused by the coronavirus by about ten-fold. In short: because it is in our power to prevent the number of deaths caused by the coronavirus (without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance), it is our moral obligation to prevent the spread of the virus by staying home.

Perhaps you are reading this and agree wholeheartedly that we are morally required to stay home. If this is the case, then I am preaching to the choir.

But perhaps you’re reading this and remain skeptical. After all, how can we be in the wrong for not staying in? We still have to leave our homes for essentials, such as food and medicine. In fact, some even recommend taking a walk for the sake of our mental health. How can we be in the wrong for trying to stay alive during a pandemic?

This is where Peter Singer’s second premise really shines. Recall that according to Singer, if we can prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we should do it. What this means, roughly, is that we should prevent harm, without incurring comparable moral harm. You’re not going to jump into the pond to save the child if you don’t know how to swim, because doing so would mean sacrificing something of comparable moral significance. Feeding oneself and one’s family is morally significant. Getting medicine for oneself and one’s family is morally significant. Preserving one’s mental health is morally significant. In short: we should stay home to prevent the spread of the virus as much as possible, and only leave home for essentials.

One might also point out the harsh reality that some do not have the option of staying home. Healthcare workers, service workers, and those deemed essential must carry on as usual. If Peter Singer’s argument is sound, one might object that by helping those struggling with COVID-19, doctors, nurses and paramedics are committing a wrong-doing. By providing people with food and water, Singer would have us believe that service workers are committing a wrong-doing. As noted above, however, if we can prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we should do it. This means that those who don’t have the option of staying home because of work are not in the wrong, because not working would mean sacrificing something of comparable moral worth.

To be sure, these are not the only objections one could raise. The objections to Singer’s original argument abound, and they could very well apply to the argument’s current application.

The aim here, however, was not so much to offer the perfect argument for staying home, but rather to motivate a different perspective on the act of sheltering in place during a pandemic.

If Singer’s argument is sound, however, we should not be congratulating each other for staying home for the same reasons we should not be congratulating each other for giving to charity. In doing these things, we are not going “above and beyond” the call of duty. By choosing to stay home during the COVID-19 pandemic, we are statistically reducing the number of lives that are impacted by the disease, and therefore acting in a way that is morally required of us. We should save the drowning child at the expense of our suit, and we should save the immune-compromised at the expense of our leisure. Without sacrificing anything comparable moral worth, we are morally bound to stay home.